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Abstract. My primary aims in this paper are to give an overview of a recent movement 
which goes by the name of ‘analytic theology’, to locate that movement within the larger 
context of contemporary philosophy of religion, and to identify some of the weakness 
or objections that analytic theology will need to address moving forward. While I think 
that some of these objections have merit, I also think that the promise of analytic the-
ology’s contribution to theology more broadly is, in my view, sufficiently robust that we 
should continue to engage in it as a theological enterprise (even if one among many).
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Introduction
My primary aims in this paper are:
(i) to give an overview of a recent movement which goes by the name 
of ‘analytic theology’,
(ii) to locate that movement within the larger context of philosophy 
of religion, and
(iii) to identify some of the weakness or objections that analytic the-
ology will need to address moving forward.
I begin with a rough comparison: analytic theology is to the 21st cen-
tury what Augustine’s use and adaptation of neo-Platonism and Aquinas’ 
On Analytic Theology
3(2)/201510
K E V I N T I M P E
use and adaptation of Aristotle were to the fourth and thirteenth centuries, 
respectively. Since its inception, Christian theology has been engaging and 
appropriating (and, it should also be noted, critiquing) the philosophy of 
the day. As Richard Swinburne puts it, “the Christian theological tradition 
is very familiar indeed with the use of the best available secular criteria to 
clarify and justify religious claims” (Swinburne 2005, 40). And this kind of 
engagement with and use of analytic philosophy is what analytic theology 
is attempting to do, though in a particular way. Now I certainly don’t mean 
to suggest that all Christian philosophical theology is ‘analytic’ in nature. 
Just as there is the purported (though hard to precisely pin down) differ-
ence between analytic and Continental philosophy, there are both analytic 
and Continental -inspired approaches to theology. And while recent years 
have seen some really interesting approaches to philosophy of religion that 
draw on what is usually seen as the Continental philosophical tradition, in 
this paper I’m going to limit the scope of my remarks to work which draws 
on analytic philosophy.
1. Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion
I’ve already suggested above that for much of its history, Christian theology 
has been engaging and incorporating the best philosophical approaches 
of the time into its theological task. The radical shift of medieval theology 
in the twelfth century with the reintroduction of Aristotle and his Arabic 
commentators to Christian Europe is perhaps the most striking example. 
However, the larger tendency dates back to many of the Patristics, and can 
also be seen throughout much of the theology of the modern period. More 
recently, especially during the early twentieth century, things shifted con-
siderably for philosophical theology with the rise of logical positivism and 
positivist empiricism and, to a lesser extent, ‘death of God’ theology. For 
a few decades in the 20th century, philosophers of religion tried to defend 
the importance of their discipline despite the claim, which some of them 
endorsed, that talk about God wasn’t even false but rather meaningless. 
Analytic philosophy of this sort wasn’t particularly kind to philosophy 
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of religion. In my experience, when many theologians think of analytic 
philosophy, this is the period that they think of. It’s perhaps not surprising 
that they then find analytic philosophy to not be conducive to their theo-
logical task.
It’s unfortunate, then, that many theologians are unaware that ana-
lytic philosophy of religion underwent a revival in the second half of the 
twentieth century as the wider ethos of analytic philosophy itself changed. 
Beginning in roughly the late 1960s, the influence of logical positivism and 
a certain kind of empiricism, which had dominated 20th-century Anglo-
-American philosophy and purportedly relegated philosophy of religion to 
meaninglessness in the process, started to wane. Traditional metaphysical 
claims again came into focus. During this ‘metaphysical turn’ of the 1970s, 
analytic philosophy of religion also entered a period of proliferation and 
continues to flourish to this day. During the 1980s and 1990s, philosophy 
of religion underwent a period of diversification, both in terms of topics 
and in terms of methodology. The sea-change has been so significant that 
Alan Torrance writes that theism’s “explanatory power is now taken more 
seriously than at any time since the beginnings of modernity” (Torrance 
2013, 30).
Commenting on the resurgence of philosophy of religion during this 
period, Eleonore Stump draws our attention to two major characteristics:
The first characteristic is a broad extension of subjects seen as appropriate 
for philosophical scrutiny. Not so long ago work in philosophy of religion was 
largely confined to discussions of the meaningfulness of religious language 
and examinations of arguments for the existence of God. In the work currently 
being done, however, philosophers have gotten their courage up and ventured 
into such areas as providence, creation, conservation, and God’s responsibility 
for sin, areas where analytic precision is more difficult to attain but where the 
scope of the investigation is less constrained.
The second feature of the new work in philosophy of religion is a willing-
ness to bridge boundaries with related disciplines, most notably with theology 
but also with biblical studies…. In leaving biblical studies entirely to historical 
scholars of the texts, contemporary philosophers were cutting themselves off 
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from a fruitful source of data about individual religions and the contributions 
those data make to issues relevant to philosophers (Stump 1993, 1).
Not only have the changes in analytic philosophy opened up the scope of 
philosophy of religion, but recently Nicholas Wolterstorff has argued that 
the revival of philosophy of religion not only took place within but was 
made possible by analytic philosophy. He picks out three major develop-
ments that contributed to this revival:
(i) the death of logical empiricism, which had previously contributed 
to an anti-metaphysical bias;
(ii) the rejection of the view that “theistic belief, to be rationally and 
responsibly held, must be rationally grounded” (Wolterstorff 2009, 
158); and
(iii) a renewed interest in meta-epistemology and alternate approach-
es to knowledge than classical foundationalism.
Within this analytic environment which at the least allows for and per-
haps—if Wolterstorff is correct—actively encourages the flourishing of phi-
losophy of religion, the diversity of philosophy of religion has continued, 
both in terms of the topics and in terms of the sources with which it starts. 
These two developments are interrelated. Analytic philosophy of religion is 
no longer limited to natural theology, which we can roughly understand as 
the attempt to establish truths about God or other theological matters on 
the basis of natural human reason, unaided by revelation. Natural theology 
typically focused on arguments for the existence of God, or how we should 
understand traditional divine attributes. But now energy is being spent on 
a richer philosophical project. Much contemporary philosophy of religion 
is what Scott MacDonald calls clarification:
The philosophical theologian engaged in clarification is not primarily con-
cerned with the epistemic justification of [a particular view]. She is concerned 
instead with understanding, developing, systematizing, and explaining it. [The 
Christian philosopher] can legitimately undertake the investigation of not only 
the question of God’s existence and attributes [issues associated with tradition-
al natural theology] but also doctrines such as trinity, incarnation, and atone-
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ment— traditional paradigms of doctrines inaccessible to natural reason. When 
the philosopher takes up these kinds of issues with the aim of articulating 
and developing them, probing their internal coherence, joint consistency, and 
systematic connections, and exploring their relations to other theological and 
nontheological doctrines, she will be engaged in appropriately philosophical 
reflection on specifically Christian theological matters (MacDonald 2009, 24f).
Topics that have begun to be explored more fully in this manner include 
the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, heaven and hell; while others–
such as the nature of Scripture and Revelation, the metaphysics of original 
sin–are only starting be the focus on inquiry. Of course, the clarification 
of many of these topics uses not only natural reason, but revelation, a par-
ticular understanding of religious tradition, or some other kind of appeal 
to authority. By expanding its sources of justification beyond mere reason, 
analytic theology can avoid some of the ‘wing clipping’ (Harris 2005, 101) 
that has plagued other approaches to philosophy of religion.
2. The task of Analytic Theology
A not-insignificant subset of what I’ve been calling analytic philosophy 
of religion aimed at clarification is what has recently been called analytic 
theology. Theologian William Abraham goes so far as to refer to “the emer-
gence of analytic theology as a natural development with analytic philo-
sophical theology” (Abraham 2013b, 3). And elsewhere he writes as follows:
Analytic theology did not begin with the publication of Analytic Theology 
[in 2009]. Richard Swinburne has been doing it for years; so have Basil Mitchell, 
John Lucas, and many others. All of my own work in theology is unintelligible 
if one does not know of my training in analytic philosophy. Yet this general 
point about the deeper history is insufficiently recognized. What we have 
now in play is a new and much more intentional phase of analytic theology 
(Abraham 2013a, 28).
I think it’s best not to see analytic theology as distinct from analytic philos-
ophy of religion (or from analytically influenced philosophical theology), 
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but rather part of it. In his introduction to what is probably the best and 
most influential collection of relevant essays to date, Mike Rea describes 
analytic theology as follows:
Roughly (and I think that ‘rough’ is the best that we can do here), [the term 
‘analytic philosophy’] refers to an approach to philosophical problems that is 
characterized by a particular rhetorical style, some common ambitions, and 
evolving technical vocabulary, and a tendency to pursue some projects in dia-
logue with a certain evolving body of literature... As I see it, analytic theology 
is just the activity of approaching theological topics with the ambitions of an 
analytic philosopher and in a style that conforms to the prescriptions that are 
distinctive of analytic philosophical discourse (Rea 2009, 3 and 7).
In the inaugural issue of the recently launched Journal of Analytic Theolo-
gy,1 Abraham describes the central ambitions of analytic philosophy (and 
thus of specifically analytic theology as well) as “first, to identify the scope 
and limits of our powers to obtain knowledge of the world; and, second, 
to provide such true explanatory theories as we can in areas of inquiry 
(metaphysics, morals, and the like) that fall outside the scope of the natu-
ral sciences” (Abraham 2013b, 6). Abraham’s and Rea’s descriptions, while 
not coextensive, I think jointly capture the approach to philosophical–
and theological–issues that is characteristic of the analytic tradition (For 
worthwhile discussions of the differences between analytic and Continen-
tal approaches to philosophy, see Beaney 2013; Glock 2008; Levy 2003).
What is interesting from at least a sociological perspective is that while 
there are a number of theologians involved in analytic theology, judging 
by the work that has published thus far analytic theology seems to be 
spearheaded primarily by philosophers. Consider, for example, the afore 
mentioned Journal of Analytic Theology. While the senior editors are split 
between the disciplines of philosophy and theology, both executive editors, 
as well as approximately 2/3 of the editorial board are housed in philoso-
phy departments. And approximately the same disciplinary breakdown is 
1 http://journalofanalytictheology.com/jat/index.php/jat. In addition to its content, another 
good feature of this journal is that it’s open source.
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found in the contributors to Crisp and Rea’s Analytic Theology collection. 
I suspect that one reason for this imbalance is a number of the objections 
to analytic theology, which I address in the subsequent section; many of 
them are more likely to be raised by theologians who might have method-
ological worries about analytic theology.
3. Challenges and Criticisms
It is probably clear from the material so far that I’m largely sympathetic 
with analytic theology, and I consider at least one of my books to be an 
instance of the approach (See Timpe 2013). However, as one should expect 
of any philosophical approach to, well, anything, analytic theology (and an-
alytic philosophy of religion more broadly) is not without its critics. Here, 
I want to outline what seem to me to be some of the major issues facing 
analytic theology as it goes forward.
The first is a general statement about the general tenor of philosophy 
as a professional discipline, in at least the English-speaking world. Though 
things are considerably better than they were in the 1960s and 70s, the dis-
cipline of academic philosophy isn’t always particularly fond of philosophy 
of religion. Basil Mitchell, for example, writes that “analytic philosophy of 
religion has always to some extent suffered from the taint of illegitimacy. 
Its practitioners have felt they needed to establish its credentials” (Mitchell 
2005, 21). As I already mentioned, things are considerably better than they 
have been in the past. But theism, or even an openness to theological is-
sues, is significantly in the minority in the field. According to the recent 
PhilPapers survey, only 16% of philosophy faculty or PhDs accept or lean 
towards theism.2 This obviously puts pressure on those philosophers work-
ing in the area from their professional guild.
Not only are most philosophers skeptical of analytic theology, but 
many theologians are also skeptical of a specifically analytic approach to 
theology. As mentioned above, many theologians influenced more by Conti-
nental approaches seem to have been working with a limited understanding 
2 http://philpapers.org/raw/survey.pdf
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of the nature of analytic philosophy in the past three (or more) decades. The 
turf and methodological battles are certainly not helped by the invocation, 
by two people involved in analytic theology, of Harry Frankfurt’s work on 
‘bullshit’ to characterize much recent theology (Abraham 2013b; Rauser 
2009). As Billy Abraham puts it at one point, “analytic philosophers are fed 
up with the bullshit that shows up in theology and are determined to fix 
theology by doing it themselves” (Abraham 2013b, 3). Even if the philos-
ophers in question are right to question the value (or orthodoxy or . . . ) of 
much of contemporary theology, the rhetorical strategy here certainly isn’t 
likely to aid their cause.
In the introduction to their recent Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The 
Impact of Analytic Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion, Harriet Harris and 
Christopher Insole write that “theologians are very resistant to engaging 
in the kind of reflection that analytical philosophers of religion employ... 
We should not assume that this is due to a sense of threat from philosophy. 
On the contrary, it is often because philosophers seem to theologians to 
take an inappropriate approach to the Bible, to religious phenomena[,] or 
to articles of faith” (Harris and Insole 2005, 17). Related here is the frequent 
charge that the God of analytic theology is the God of the philosophers, 
not the God of the Christian tradition—not the God of Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob, as it is sometimes put. According to some theologians, some 
of the philosophers involved in reflection on religion are more shaped by 
the history of and contemporary trends within their own discipline (and 
keep in mind here the frequent charge that analytic philosophy itself is 
too a-historical) than they are by the historical nature of the faith that 
they claim to be applying their philosophical tools to. Doing theology well 
requires engagement with sources, disciplines, and approaches that do not 
easily lend themselves to analytic analysis, and few philosophers have pro-
fessional training in these areas. The philosopher seeking to address the 
Christian faith, Alan Torrance writes,
is obliged to engage with a book that is full of metaphor, rhetorical plays, and 
the semantic shifting of everyday concepts, not to mention the kind of counter-
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intuitive claims and hermeneutical dilemmas that would cause most analytic 
philosophers to turn to drink. This makes it tempting for theologians to allow 
the theism of natural theology to condition the distinctively historical charac-
ter of knowledge of God as we find it presented in the philosophically count-
er-intuitive testimony of the Old and New Testaments (Torrance 2013, 31).
While this might be taken as a suggestion that analytic theology is mis-
guided by the attempt to use tools other than those typically used in the-
ology, that is not the point. “On the contrary,” says Abraham,
we need the help of analytic theology to do justice to the God we meet in the 
worship of the Church. We can cut to the chase by noting that the God we have 
identified in our initial orientation is not some idol cooked up by philosophers, 
but precisely the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the triune God of 
Christian Creed and worship. The first task of a doctrine of God in analytic 
theology is to unpack as fully as possible what is involved in confessing that 
we believe in the triune God of the Church (Abraham 2009, 61f).
A related concern, and one that I think not only needs to be addressed but 
will be addressed as analytic theology matures a bit more, is that “analytic 
theology appears totally unrealistic when you look at what is needed to 
get the job done in theology” (Abraham 2013b, 4). The idea here is that 
doing theology well “involves initiation into several ancient and modern 
languages, into the historical study of scripture, into the history of the 
church and its teachings, and into normative assessment of the practices, 
ethics, and doctrines of the tradition” (Abraham 2013b, 4). Regarding the 
first part of Abrahams’s worry, Marc Cortez, himself a theologian, suggests 
that if this objection cuts against analytic theology, it also cuts against 
most contemporary theology: “I shudder to think what would happen if 
many of these same standards were applied to theologians in general” 
(Cortez 2013, 22). But Cortez does worry about the “practical neglect of 
biblical texts in much of the theology that has been shaped by the analytic 
method” (Cortez 2013, 23).
Another worry with analytic theology that toughs on the above con-
cerns is its scope. Even within ‘theology proper’ here, Abraham argues, the-
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ology is systematic in nature. But contemporary analytic philosophy isn’t 
known for being historically sensitive and has few system-builders (David 
Lewis being the most obvious counterexample), tending instead to work by 
the division of intellectual division of labor. These two tendencies don’t 
then lend analytic philosophers to do analytic theology with the historical 
sensitivity and overarching care that many theologians think is essential.
Yet another objection often raised is that the analytic style subverts 
the proper goals of theology, in its over-concern for clarity and precision. 
There’s a worry here that “a certain kind of precisionist analysis can take 
us off track” (Abraham 2013b, 10) insofar as “the unguarded use of the an-
alytic method [can] produce a hyper- intellectualism that values conceptual 
precision and winning arguments over spiritual formation and worship” 
(Cortez 2013, 24). Mike Rea expresses (but doesn’t endorse) this objection 
as follows:
The prescriptions that characterize the analytic tradition reflect the wrong set of 
priorities. The problem with analytic philosophy is that it prioritizes clarity and 
precision at the expense of everything else, and it ignores the fact that some-
times, in order to attain wisdom and understanding, we have to rely substantively 
on metaphor and other literary tropes... The prescriptions that favor clarity and 
well-understood primitives and that proscribe substantive use of metaphor part-
ly constrain our choice of topics. So, in other words, part of the concern is that 
philosophers will miss out on the pursuit of wisdom simply by ignoring rich and 
messy topics in favor of ones that admit of neat, precise, and literal discussion 
(Rea 2009, 18f).
In my view, this criticism is at least partially deserved, though like some 
of the other criticisms above, I suspect that this will change as analytic 
theology continues to mature.
A final criticism that I’ll address here is that concern that theology 
is tied to the mission of the Church–encouraging people to love God and 
not just think true thoughts about Him–in a way that philosophy isn’t. “If 
there’s a weakness for analytic theology at this point, it is that analytical-
ly-minded theologians have often failed to put adequate time and effort 
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into communicating the results of their research to the church. They often 
seem to feel that their work is done once they have constructed their tech-
nical arguments, leaving it to others to determine how best to integrate 
their insights into life and ministry” (Stump 2010, 24). And some of the 
concerns about analytic philosophy—e.g., its over-focus on left-brain skills, 
its over-valuing of “intricate, technically expert argument ... [which] has 
a tendency to focus more and more on less and less”—apply to analytic 
theology as well (Stump 2010, 24).
There are other objects as well that I don’t have time to more than 
mention at present: that analytic theology, like analytic philosophy, is his-
torically insensitive; that all metaphysical theorizing about God is a simu-
lacrum or idolatrous; etc... It’s not clear to me that any of these objections 
are fatal to the project of analytic theology. The totality of concerns that 
I’ve canvased does, however, raise some concerns that should be kept in 
mind and addressed as analytic theology goes forward if it is to live up to 
the expectations that many have for it. But I’m reasonably confident that 
those scholars (both philosophers and theologians) doing analytic theology 
can address these concerns moving forward. The promise of analytic theol-
ogy and its potential contribution to theology more broadly are, in my view, 
sufficiently robust that we should continue to engage in it as a theological 
enterprise (even if one among many).3
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